When Iran’s internet connectivity fell to one per cent of normal levels on January 8, the digital blackout surpassed anything the country had experienced before. The Islamic regime’s crackdown on protesters had extended to the virtual realm, severing citizens from the outside world with surgical precision. Not that Iran is hardly unique in its mastery of digital isolation. Around the world, authoritarian governments have become adept at pulling the plug.
The mechanics of a shutdown are worryingly straightforward. Countries control internet access by manipulating the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which acts as the internet’s routing system. By withdrawing BGP routes, a country can make itself digitally invisible to the rest of the world. Syria pioneered this method in 2012, simultaneously withdrawing routes from all upstream providers. China tested something similar in 2024, disconnecting its one billion users for an hour.
More sophisticated regimes employ layered approaches. Iran’s recent shutdown combined DNS poisoning, protocol whitelisting and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), all techniques that block specific services whilst maintaining a façade of connectivity for monitoring tools. Russia has perfected soft blocking, throttling platforms such as WhatsApp to the point of uselessness without triggering the international outcry that full shutdowns provoke. Such selective censorship is harder to detect and more politically palatable.
At the extreme end are countries in which internet isolation is permanent. North Korea maintains Kwangmyong, a domestic intranet stocked with propaganda and approved educational material, accessible only to the elite. Global internet access requires a special pass which few have been granted, and even these privileged users must visit government buildings to connect. Censorship of the internet in Turkmenistan follows a similar pattern, although its implementation is less systematic.
Even Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), long the traditional workaround for circumventing censorship (and accessing geoblocked content), are not as effective as they once were. Rogue regimes will deploy DPI to identify and block VPN traffic. Several countries ban VPNs outright. The Vienna-based Chronicles of Turkmenistan reports that censors in Ashgabat will whitelist certain VPNs in exchange for payment, thereby turning digital repression into rent-seeking.
Besides, while tech-savvy users may have several VPNs installed in case the state blocks one or more of them, when the internet itself is severed, no amount of encryption helps.
Sleeping satellites
This is where satellite technology becomes relevant. During Iran’s blackout, thousands of smuggled Starlink terminals provided a digital lifeline until the government began disrupting them through GPS jamming and targeted interference, or simply by going house-to-house and confiscating receivers. Russia has perfected similar techniques in Ukraine, using high-powered jammers along the front lines.
Starlink is not the only circus in town, however. OneWeb, now merged with Eutelsat, operates 648 satellites targeting enterprise and government markets. Amazon’s Amazon Leo, formerly known as Project Kuiper, has been launching satellites since last year and plans to begin offering services later in 2026. The proliferation of providers should make blanket jamming more difficult, as authoritarian regimes cannot block all frequencies simultaneously without likely crippling their own communications infrastructure.
Mesh networks offer another solution, although their limitations are many. These decentralised systems allow devices to relay data peer-to-peer, independent of ISPs. Activists in Hong Kong have used such networks. Although they struggle at scale due to range limitations, bandwidth constraints, and maintenance overheads, they can offer value in short-term tactical deployment.
For business, an opportunity
The business opportunity in censorship circumvention is both substantial and fraught. The US-funded Open Technology Fund supports circumvention tools serving users in China, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, covering the marginal costs of providing services to non-monetisable users. The Tor Project, founded in 2002, continues to develop anonymous browsing technology used by millions worldwide. Operating in this space requires navigating treacherous geopolitics, however, given that several governments view circumvention providers as threats. Russia, for example, banned the dissemination of information about such tools in 2024.
The opportunity, however, is there. Internet shutdowns cost the global economy an estimated 19.7 billion US dollars in 2025. The technology to circumvent censorship exists; what’s lacking is political will. Satellite constellations could blanket authoritarian states with uncensorable connectivity, but doing so might be considered an act of digital warfare. Elon Musk’s willingness to provide Starlink terminals to Ukraine demonstrates both the technology’s potential and its political sensitivity. Furthermore, he has been accused of ‘turning off’ Starlink for certain periods. Connectivity should not rely on the whim of one man.
Censorship is arguably a solved technical problem waiting for political will to catch up. The tools (satellites, encrypted protocols, decentralised networks) exist. Tech firms remain reluctant to deploy censorship-resistant architecture at scale, fearing government retaliation. The cat-and-mouse game will likely continue, with authoritarian regimes investing in AI-powered censorship systems whilst circumvention developers race to stay ahead. The digital iron curtain may bend, but it will not break easily.
Photo: Dreamstime.
