Corporate Stability

Steady as she sinks

Corporate stability is a mirage, and making it a business goal is usually fatal

Reinvantage InsightOctober 26, 20265 min read
Dreamstime

When Volkswagen tore up its job-security agreement in September 2024, Thorsten Gröger, chief negotiator for IG Metall (Germany’s mighty engineering union), reached for the sort of metaphor that comes naturally to people who spend their working lives around cars: a job guarantee, he said, was needed not just in good times but especially in bad ones, when it should serve as an “airbag” for the workforce. It was, granted, a nice line (and, in fairness, a well meant one). It was also, however, it should be pointed out, a bit of a giveaway, in that airbags do just one thing, which is to deploy after a crash has taken place.

The agreement dated back to 1994, when VW (which was heavily overstaffed back then, too) swapped a four-day week and a pay cut for the stability of a promise that nobody would be shown the door, a promise that was renewed, renewed, and renewed again, for 30 years. Thirty years is a long time to go without asking whether what is actually being stabilised still works, of course, and that is hardly a problem exclusive to carmakers.

Economists (who, difficult as it to admit, deserve a little credit from time to time) have known about the phenomenon for a while, although their warnings often went ignored, such as those of Hyman Minsky, an American economist who spent much of his career being ignored by the mainstream (and much of the period after his death in 1996 being rediscovered, usually in the middle of a crash). Minsky argued that stability is itself destabilising, reasoning that long stretches of calm persuade business leaders (as well as their investors and lenders) that calm is the natural order of things. In February 2004 Ben Bernanke, then a governor of the US Federal Reserve, gave a speech celebrating the Great Moderation, two decades in which the hitherto wild swings in American output and inflation had shrunk dramatically. To be fair to Bernanke (who went on to chair the Fed through the crash that subsequently followed), he did concede that some of it might have been nothing more than luck, in which case there was no particular reason to expect it to last. And, quelle surprise, it didn’t.

What later happened at the now infamous Silicon Valley Bank was the Minsky doctrine in miniature. Founded in 1983, the bank had by the end become the lender of choice for roughly half of America’s venture-backed tech firms, which (flush with cash during the long years of cheap money) kept much of it there. The bank, for its part, parked most of those deposits in long-dated bonds. That seemed sensible enough at the time, so long as interest rates stayed low and depositors stayed put, and in the end neither assumption held. When the Fed started raising rates in 2022 (and raising them faster than at any point in almost 30 years), the value of those bonds fell, and it turned out that the bank had let most of the hedges that might have protected it lapse (reportedly with one eye on short-term profits). Worse, around 90 per cent of its deposits sat above the federal insurance limit. Their owners, egged on by their venture-capital backers (and no doubt a fair few group chats), did what nervous people with uninsured money tend to do. In March 2023 they tried to take out 42 billion US dollars in a single day, and by the following morning the bank was gone. So much for stability. A review led by Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice-chair for supervision, later found that Silicon Valley Bank had 31 unaddressed supervisory warnings outstanding when it failed, about three times the average for its peers. The warning signs had been there, but had gone left unread, a familiar tale at businesses large and small across the world.

For a generation Intel’s chips sat inside more or less every office computer on the planet, a position just about as close to corporate stability as it gets.

The problem (or, perhaps, challenge) for most of those businesses that prize stability above all else is that collapse rarely comes in a day, usually taking a lot longer, going unseen until everything goes wrong. For a generation Intel’s chips sat inside more or less every office computer on the planet (a position just about as close to corporate stability as it gets). The firm was worth around half a trillion dollars in 2000 but just over 100 billion US dollars by late 2024, after a 16.6 billion US dollars loss in the third quarter of that year, the largest in its history. Again, so much for stability. Pat Gelsinger, the boss brought in to fix the company, left on December 1, 2024. In roughly four years he had failed to win back the ground Intel had lost while the firm’s dominance felt stable and permanent.

There is also plenty of decent evidence to suggest that stability was never really the normal state of affairs, merely a pleasant (and, arguably, mirage-like) interlude that people mistook for the prevailing climate. Innosight, a consultancy, has tracked how long firms survive in America’s S&P 500 index (admittedly not an entirely perfect gauge, given that companies can leave it through mergers and acquisitions as well as failure). The average tenure was 33 years in 1964, had shrunk to 24 years by 2016, and is forecast to fall to just 12 years by 2027. If even the S&P 500 is now anything but stable, why continue to value stability?

The trouble for most firms is that the warning signs rarely look like warning signs and that far too few executives or board members have the ability to read them. Even if they can, it’s usually far more comfortable and reassuring to write them off as cyclical blips. As long as the airbag hasn’t deployed, it’s all good and everything’s stable (forgetting, of course, that if the airbag has indeed deployed then the car is already likely wedged around the trunk of a tree).

Reinvantage Insight

The byline Reinvantage Insight is used to denote articles to which several members of the Reinvantage insight and analysis team may have contributed.